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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 13-3296 & 14-4110 
___________ 
 
CALVIN BUTLER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT; HARDEN, 
Assistant District Attorney; OFFICER PEREZ, Badge Number Omitted; GERALD 
STEIN, Esq.; DISTRICT ATTORNEY PHILADELPHIA; OFFICER JUAN BORRERO; 
OFFICER BARR 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-01955) 
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 9, 2015 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 9, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Calvin Butler appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing his 
amended complaint in part and granting summary judgment in favor of the remaining 
defendants.  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
This case arises out of Butler’s October 17, 2010 arrest.  At about 9:45 p.m. on 
that day, Butler was parked on West Lehigh Avenue in Philadelphia, waiting for a friend 
with whom he planned to “get high.”  The friend was late, and Butler leaned back and 
rested his head against the headrest.  Philadelphia Police Officers Barr and Borrero then 
approached his car.  According to them, they found Butler passed out with a belt tied 
around his arm; nearby, the officers saw a bloody hypodermic needle, pills, and other 
items indicative of drug use.  They roused Butler, ordered him to exit the automobile, and 
observed that he was incoherent, glassy eyed, and unsteady on his feet.  Butler 
acknowledges that the officers found the needle, pills, and belt, but claims that the former 
two were medication for diabetes and the latter was merely an innocuous article of 
clothing.  In any event, the officers arrested Butler for driving under the influence.   
Butler was subsequently charged with driving under the influence in violation of 
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802.  Butler retained attorney Gerald Stein to represent him.  
According to Butler, at either a pretrial or trial proceeding, Philadelphia Police Officer 
Perez testified about the circumstances surrounding Butler’s arrest — despite, Butler 
 3 
 
claims, having no involvement in the arrest.  Ultimately, Butler’s case was dismissed due 
to the Commonwealth’s failure to prosecute.  
After proceedings not relevant here, Butler filed an amended complaint, naming as 
defendants Officers Barr, Borrero, Perez; the City of Philadelphia; Attorney Stein; 
District Attorney Seth Williams; and Assistant District Attorney Kevin Harden.  
Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Butler alleged that the defendants had violated his 
constitutional rights in a variety of ways; he also asserted numerous state-law claims.  
The District Court granted Attorney Stein’s motion to dismiss.  Butler then filed a notice 
of appeal as to that order, and the District Court certified the order pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  That appeal has been docketed at C.A. No. 13-
3296.  Subsequently, the District Court granted summary judgment to the remaining 
defendants.  Butler appealed that order; that appeal has been docketed at C.A. No. 14-
4110.  We have consolidated the two cases.   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise a plenary standard of 
review over the District Court’s orders.  See Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 
209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013) (motion to dismiss); State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro 
Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009) (summary judgment). 
We agree with the District Court’s analysis of this case.  As the District Court 
explained, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that she was deprived 
of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 
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626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).  It is well established that “[a]ttorneys 
performing their traditional functions will not be considered state actors solely on the 
basis of their position as officers of the court.”  Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 
184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999).  This rule is fatal to Butler’s federal claims against 
Attorney Stein.  Butler tries to avoid this conclusion by alleging that Stein possessed an 
affidavit that suggested that, despite Butler’s recollection, Perez had had a role in his 
arrest.  Butler asserts that Stein’s possession of this document reveals that he was 
involved in a conspiracy with the federal defendants and thus acted under color of state 
law.  These allegations are altogether too tenuous to provide “‘plausible grounds to infer 
an agreement.’”  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 
178 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in dismissing Butler’s § 1983 claims against 
Attorney Stein.1 
Nor did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Officers Barr and 
Borrero on Butler’s claims of false arrest and false imprisonment.  To prevail under either 
theory, Butler was required show that the officers arrested him without probable cause.  
See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634-36 (3d Cir. 1995).  An arrest is 
performed with probable cause if “at the moment the arrest was made the facts and 
                                              
1 Butler also asserted state-law claims against Attorney Stein.  The District Court did not 
err in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.  See Figueroa v. 
Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999); see also WWBITV, Inc. v. Vill. 
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circumstances within the officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the 
suspect had committed or was committing an offense.”  Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 
595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks, alterations omitted).  “Probable cause need 
only exist as to any offense that could be charged under the circumstances.”  Barna v. 
City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 
U.S. 146, 153 (2004).   
We agree with the District Court that a reasonable jury would not find that the 
officers lacked probable cause to arrest Butler for possessing drug paraphernalia in 
violation of 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(32).  Butler acknowledges that, as the 
officers reported, he possessed hypodermic needles at the time of his arrest, which 
qualify as “drug paraphernalia” under the statute.  See 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-102(b).  
While Butler contends that he used the needles for a medical purpose, the other 
undisputed “facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge” — including that 
Butler was incoherent, glassy eyed, and unsteady on his feet; that there was also a belt in 
a location suggesting that Butler used it in conjunction with the needle; and that there 
were other items in the car that appeared to be either illegal drugs or the trappings thereof 
— were sufficient to establish probable cause that Butler possessed drug paraphernalia.  
Because this evidence would not reasonably support a contrary factual finding, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
of Rouses Point, 589 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants.  See Merkle v. 
Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788-89 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Finally, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer 
Perez on Butler’s claim that Perez testified falsely at his trial or in pretrial hearings.  As 
the District Court explained, police officers are absolutely immune from damages 
liability based on their testimony in court proceedings.  See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 
325, 345-46 (1983); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.2 
 
                                              
2 While Butler presented several other claims in the District Court — including, among 
others, claims against District Attorney Seth Williams and Assistant District Attorney 
Kevin Harden — he has not discussed them in his briefs on appeal, and has therefore 
waived review of the District Court’s disposition of those claims.  See United States v. 
Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 
874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  Further, Butler complains that Officer Perez did not 
answer his complaint, but that is not accurate; Officer Perez filed an answer on December 
19, 2013.   
